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DOES THE FUTURE OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS
CHANGE AFTER HA wKiNS v. LESLIE 'S POOL MART, INC. ?
LISA N. HAYDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1947, Congress enacted the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).' The purpose of FIFRA is to
"centraliz[e] the pesticide registration process and insur[e] the accurate
labeling of pesticides."2 Many courts have questioned whether this
federal Act preempts product liability claims in light of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
3
This Comment analyzes the Third Circuit's treatment of the
issue of preemption in pesticide labeling and packaging claims
presented in Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc.4 In Hawkins, the Third
Circuit held that the plaintiff's failure to warn claim and failure to
provide adequate directions claim were preempted by FIFRA'
However, the plaintiff's packaging claim was not preempted since the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not regulated this area.'
Section II of this Comment describes the legal background of
FIFRA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Section III discusses the history and procedural posture of this case.
Section IV describes Hawkins' claims, the Third Circuit's analysis, and
its holding. Section V focuses on the impact of the Third Circuit's
decision in relation to other circuits' holdings concerning this issue.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Supremacy Clause
Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states,
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
*J.D. 200 1, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1999)
[hereinafter FIFRA].
2Daniel B. Nelson, No Cause.for Relief: FIFRA 's Preemptive Scope After Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 565, 566 (1996).3U.S. CONST. art. VI, el. 2.
'Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 244 (3d Cir. 1999).
51d.
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J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
7
The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the authority to preempt state
law with federal legislation.
There are three types of preemption: express, implied, and
conflict. FIFRA is an expressed preemption statute since the
preemptive component is contained in the language of the statute.'"
The expressed language contained in FIFRA ordinarily means that the
court does not need to go beyond the language of the statute."
B. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The preemption component of FIFRA is located in United
States Code Section 136v. This section states:
[a] State may regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the
State, but only if and to the extent the regulation
does not permit any sale or use prohibited by
this subchapter. Such State shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling
or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter."
In 1972, the increasing concern over environmental
consequences of pesticide usage prompted Congress to amend FIFRA. 
3
The legislative history of FIFRA demonstrates Congressional intent to
preempt state regulation of pesticide labeling and packaging. The
House Committee Report on the 1972 amendments to FIFRA notes
that, "[i]n dividing the responsibility between the states and the Federal
government for the management of an effective pesticide program, the
Committee has adopted language which is intended to completely
preempt State authority in regard to labeling and packaging."'
4
7
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
'See Gibbons v- Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210-11 (1824).
9
Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 247.
'07 U.S.C. § 136v (1999).
"See Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248.
127 U.S.C. § 136v (emphasis added).
3
id-
'4 H.R. Rep. No. 92-51 I, at 16 (1971), quoted in Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248.
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In the 1970s, Congress also created the EPA." The EPA
administers and enforces FIFRA. 6  The EPA determines the




Dawn-Marie Hawkins opened a container of Leslie's
Chlorinator Tablets I and suffered a burning sensation in her throat and
lungs as well as breathing difficulty.'8 James and Dawn-Marie Hawkins
(Hawkins) filed a diversity action in New Jersey Federal District Court
against Leslie's Pool Mart (Leslie's), the manufacturer, alleging
negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium.9
Hawkins asserted three claims. First, they claimed that Leslie's failed
to warn of the hazards associated with the product.2 0 Second, they
claimed that Leslie's was negligent in failing to provide adequate
directions or precautions regarding the opening, closing and/or storage
of the package.2' Third, they claimed Leslie's failed to package the
product in a manner adequate to prevent excessive chemical
decomposition, contamination, combustion, or generation of fumes and
gases."2
The District Court, in granting Leslie's summary judgment, held
that FIFRA preempted Hawkins' claims of failure to warn, failure to
provide adequate directions, and failure to adequately package the
product.23 The District Court reasoned that imposing liability would
require the manufacturer to alter the labeling and packaging approved by


















2"Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 965 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 184 F.3d 244
(3d Cir. 1999).241d. at 572.
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IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
A. Holding
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that FIFRA
preempted two of Hawkins' claims: failure to warn and failure to
provide adequate directions for opening. However, in regard to the third
claim, the court held FIFRA did not preempt negligence in packaging.
The court made this decision in light of the history of FIFRA.
The court held, "FIFRA expressly preempts state imposed requirements
in the areas of labeling and packaging that are 'in addition to or
different from those required "5 by the EPA."' Since the EPA has not
regulated the area of packaging, apart from child-resistant packaging,
the requirements cannot be in addition to or different from those
required and thus are not preempted."
FIFRA specifically mentions the term "requirements."'
Some courts have discussed the issue of whether a tort claim qualifies
as requirements.29 The Third Circuit held the term "requirements" in
Section 136v of FIFRA included "not only state statutory law but also
state common-law damage claims."" Other courts have also followed
this reasoning." The Third Circuit, however, had reservations on
whether this term would preclude all state damage claims. "If
Congress's true intention was to preclude all common law causes of
action, it could have stated that all remedies, rather than requirements,
under state law pertaining to pesticides, fungicides, and rodenticides are
precluded."'3
B. Hawkins' Labeling Claims
FIFRA Section 136(p)(2) defines labeling as "all labels and all
other written, printed, or graphic matter.., accompanying the pesticide
or device at any time."'33 Hawkins asserted two labeling claims.
2-U.S.C. § 136v (1999).26Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 249.271d. at 253-54.
2S7 U.S.C. § 136v ("Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements
2'See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,487-88 (1996); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
"Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 249.
"See Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 487-88; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 U.S.
at 247.
"Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 249.
337 U.S.C. § 136(p)(2) (1999).
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1. Failure to Warn Claim
The Third Circuit held that FIFRA preempted Hawkins' first
claim that Leslie's failed to warn of sudden decomposition and sudden
reactivity of the pesticide."' This claim was preempted by the specific
labeling requirements created by the EPA."
When analyzing Hawkins' labeling claims, the Third Circuit
looked to other statutes that involve preemption for guidance. For
example, the preemption component of the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969,36 the statute at issue in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,3 7 is very similar to the preemptive language of FIFRA.5
Therefore, many circuits have used Cipollone in holding that FIFRA
preempts state law failure to warn claims, as well.
Despite this authority, Hawkins claimed that the Supreme Court
case, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,39 applied to this issue, not Cipollone.
Hawkins claimed that the decision in Medtronic "effectively overturns
all of the cases which made the facile leap from the Cipollone
plurality's opinion to a conclusion that common law claims were
requirements different from or in addition to federal regulations."'4
Medtronic held that the Medical Device Amendments did not
preempt state or local requirements that are the same as or substantially
similar to the requirements imposed under federal law.4 The Medical
Device Amendments, enacted in 1976, provide for the safety of medical
devices intended for human use. The Supreme Court, in looking at the
Congressional intent of the statute, ruled that the claims were not
preempted. The Court said that if these claims were preempted, then
consumers would be precluded from bringing any cause of action
against the manufacturers.43 Therefore, there would be "the perverse
effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an
entire industry.. ..
4Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 249.
35ld.
3615 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
37Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). See Taylor AG Indus. v.
Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995); Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.
1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l., 47 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
"7 U.S.C. § 136 (1999).
19518 U.S. 470 (1996).
'PIs.' Opp'n Br. at 16-17, quotedin Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 965 F. Supp. 566,
570 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Hawkins contended that FIFRA and the Medical Device
Amendments are "virtually identical,"' 5 and therefore FIFRA should not
preempt their claims. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, as well.
The Third Circuit stated that it did not read Medironic as "standing for
the overreaching premise that tort claims fall outside 'preemptive
requirements. "' The court distinguished Medtronic, asserting that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the device without
performing an extensive evaluation.47 By comparison to Leslie's Pool
Mart, the EPA withheld approval of the chlorinator tablets and labels
until Leslie's used specific labeling language that it mandated- The
record was clear that the EPA scrutinized the labels proposed by
Leslie's and withheld approval until the required language was
incorporated.4 9
The EPA has absolute control of the labeling of pesticides. 0
"This absolute control of labeling regulation indicates that the
Hawkins' claim that labeling different from that approved by the EPA
should have been included on the container is preempted."' An
overwhelming majority of both state and federal courts have reached
the same conclusion in light of Medtronic."2
2. Failure to Provide Adequate Directions Claim
Hawkins argued the second claim, failure to provide adequate
directions for opening and closing the container, did not impose
requirements that are different from or in addition to federal
requirements; therefore, they are not preempted. 3 The Third Circuit
clearly disagreed.
Hawkins also contended the claim was based on instructions
placed on the lid of the container, not the label.' Rejecting this
argument, the Third Circuit interpreted the literal reading of the statute
4
SHawkins, 184 F.3d at 250.
461d.




540 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1999).
"
1
Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 251.
51See, e.g., Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1 st Cir. 1996); Taylor
AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555,561 (9th Cir. 1995); Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc.,
59 F.3d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l., 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995);
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d
516, 518 (I th Cir. 1993).




to mean that "labeling" included all printed matter that comes with the
pesticide."5
The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of
this claim. Dissenting Circuit Judge Mansmann believed that the
majority had misconstrued Hawkins' argument and rejected it on
factual instead of legal grounds. 6 Judge Mansmann emphasized that
Hawkins contended that the claims escape preemption "not because of
the instructions' location but because they were never reviewed and
approved by the EPA.""7 The dissent stated there was no demonstration
in the record that the EPA reviewed and approved the package
instructions at issue." The dissent believed that with the absence of
agency review and approval, there was no federal "requirement" to
which a state law duty as to claims may be different or additional. 9
Therefore, according to the dissent, there was no preemption under
FIFRA. The dissenting opinion emphasized that the majority and
Leslie's conceded that the inclusion of unapproved labeling material
was itself a violation of FIFRA.6" The dissent believed Hawkins should
be permitted to pursue the claim based on the opening instructions if
they were not reviewed and approved by the EPA.62
Hawkins asserted another argument related to areas not
considered by FIFRA or the EPA. Hawkins asserted, "[n]owhere do the
regulations address the appropriate directions for opening a package in
any given condition." '63 The Third Circuit viewed this argument as one
without merit. "The EPA mandated and approved language on the
labels specifically instructed the user on protective actions to take when
opening the container and using the pesticide." The federal
requirements do specify directions for the disposal and proper storage
of the pesticide.65 "These instructions necessarily implicate 'opening
instructions."'" The instructions tell the consumer to avoid breathing
55
1d.





Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 256.
591d.
6id.
"Id. at 257. See also Brief for Appellee at II, Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 184 F.3d
244 (3d. Cir. 1999) (No. 98-5229) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(A) and observing that "It]hus, no
one in the chain of commerce is free to add additional warnings, information or instructions on its
own after a particular label has been approved by the EPA."); Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 250 ("FIFRA
disallows any changes to any EPA-approved label unless the EPA approves the change.").
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the harmful fumes and to wear protective clothing and eyewear 7 The
Third Circuit ruled that the "comprehensiveness" of these instructions
preempted Hawkins' claims.6" Holding otherwise would impose
labeling requirements additional to those specified by the EPA. 9
C. Hawkins' Defective Packaging Claims
In their third claim, Hawkins alleged that Leslie's
"negligent[ly] fail[ed] to package the product in a manner adequate to
prevent excessive chemical decomposition, contamination, combustion,
or generation of fumes and gases."7 The District Court had previously
ruled that this claim was also preempted.7 Hawkins, on appeal, argued
that the only area the EPA has regulated in the area of packaging is that
of child-resistant packaging. Therefore, their claims would not be
preempted since they would not impose a requirement different from or
additional to the packaging requirements already in place. 2 Leslie's
countered that FIFRA explicitly mentioned "state imposed labeling and
packaging requirements;" therefore, these areas were the "exclusive
domain" of the government and any other requirement was preempted.73
In addressing the parties' arguments, the Third Circuit
identified the domain preempted, the legislative intent of FIFRA, and
the EPA regulations." First, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the
text of FIFRA made it clear that the EPA had authority 5 to regulate all
areas of packaging. 6 Second, the court looked to the legislative intent
of FIFRA. The legislative history indicated that "Subsection (b)
preempts any State labeling or packaging requirements differing from
such requirements under the Act."77 The court noted, however, one can
infer that state and federal labeling and packaging requirements could
67
Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 252.
68id.
69d. See also Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1995).
7
0 Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 252.
" Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 965 F.Supp. 566,572 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 184 F.3d
244 (3d Cir. 1999).
7"Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 252.
73d.
71d. at 253.
7'7 U.S.C.A. § 136q(e) (2000) (Administrator of EPA "shall... promulgate regulations
for the design of pesticide containers that will promote the safe storage and disposal of
pesticides"); Id. § 136w(c)(3) (Administrator authorized "to establish standards ... with respect to
the package, container, or wrapping in which a pesticide or device is enclosed for use or
consumption, in order to protect children and adults from serious injury or illness resulting from
accidental ingestion or contact with pesticides or devices regulated by this subchapter..").
7
Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 253.
77Id. (citing SEN. REP. No. 92-838 (1972)).
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coexist.7" The legislative history indicated that the language of the
statute prohibited local governments from imposing requirements that
differed from those imposed by Federal and State authorities.79
Third, the Third Circuit considered the EPA regulations. Only
one EPA regulation governed pesticide labeling."0 United States Code
Section 136w(a)(1) established the requirements of this regulation.
This section provided that the administrator was authorized to
"establish standards with respect to the package, container or wrapping
in which a pesticide or device is enclosed in order to protect children
and adults from serious injury or illness resulting from accidental
ingestion or contact with pesticides or devices regulated under the
Act.""
In ruling that Hawkins' packaging claim was not preempted,
the Third Circuit noted that the EPA had only exercised its power in the
area of child-resistant packaging.82 The court held:
where... a preemption provision is dependent
on government regulations, we cannot extend
the reach of that provision to areas not actively
regulated by the federal government . . . the
EPA's failure to promulgate packaging
regulations outside the area of child-resistant
packaging is fatal to Leslie's Pool Mart's
preemption argument. When no federal
packaging requirements have been established,
logic dictates that a state law packaging
requirement cannot be different from or in
addition to the absent federal requirement.83
Hawkins will be able to have the packaging claims evaluated on
the facts since the Third Circuit ruled that they were not preempted.
The fact-finder will determine whether Leslie's is to be held liable in
negligently packaging the product. The claims as to labeling are
preempted; thus, they are precluded from being presented to the fact-
finder.
7 8




"See 40 C.F.R. § 157.20 (2001) (this subpart "prescribes requirements for child-
resistant packaging of pesticide products and devices").
"'Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 253 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(I), (c)(3) (1989)).
921d.
83 Id. at 253-54.
2001-02]
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V. IMPACT OF FIFRA ON STATE ACTIONS
Circuit courts across the nation have consistently ruled FIFRA
preempts state product liability claims as to labeling. "[N]umerous
courts84 have held that common law failure to warn claims, and claims
that otherwise challenge the adequacy of information provided on the
product label, are preempted by FIFRA." 5
The preemption defense has even been relied upon beyond just
adequacy of the label. The Fifth Circuit, in Andrus v. Agrevo USA
Company,6 held that FIFRA preempted state law claims asserting that
the herbicide in issue did not perform as advertised on the label, even to
the extent the plaintiffs relied on advice from the manufacturer's field
representative. 7 In Andrus, the plaintiffs made a state law claim for
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
8 The
court held that this cause of action was preempted by FIFRA since it
constituted a state law requirement that depended on the inadequacies
in labeling and packaging. 9
However, a few courts have held that these types of state
actions are not preempted. For example, the Southern District of New
York, in Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co.," held that a claim brought
by a widow against the manufacturer of an herbicide that allegedly
caused the death of her husband was not preempted. The court rejected
the manufacturer's claim that FIFRA preempted the action.
9 The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has also ruled that the significant role
that the manufacturer played in the regulatory scheme of FIFRA
indicated that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field of
pesticide labeling; therefore, the inadequate warnings claims were not
preempted.92
These courts, however, are in the minority. As discussed
above, the majority of both state and federal courts have held that
FIFRA preempts state common law damage claims."3 The case law that
See, e.g., King v. E.i DuPont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993.),
cert. dismissed, 5 10 U.S. 985, 114 S.Ct. 490, 126 L.Ed.2d 440 (1993); Grenier v. Vermont Log
BIdgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559,563-65 (1 st Cir. 1996); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th
Cir. 1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993).
1
5Anne E. Cohen, et al., Developments in Preemption of Products Liability Cases,
SC57 ALI-ABA 243, 267 (1998).
6178 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 1999).
"I1d. at 399-400.
88id. at 395.
'91d. at 399. See also Taylor AG Indus v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555,563 (9th Cir. 1995).
9°1988 WL 52779 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
911d.
92Cox v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 704 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
93See supra note 76.
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governs this area strongly indicates that Congressional intent was to
preempt the field of pesticide regulation.
However, it is important to note that preemption does not
protect manufacturers from liability if they negligently manufacture the
product. Consumers can still bring suit against the manufacturer if they
are injured due to a faulty product." The manufacturers can also be
liable if they fail to disclose all relevant information to the EPA.91
Since the EPA must approve the label before the product can be sold, it
is very important that the EPA has all relevant information regarding
the pesticide.
Distinguishing between the failure to warn and negligent
manufacturing can be difficult. However, it is critical in ruling on these
types of claims. "[N]early all claims for negligent or defective design
can be recharacterized as failure to warn claims." The Fourth Circuit
has developed a test to make this distinction. "[T]he claim is for
inadequate warning, and not design, if a reasonable manufacturer's
response to liability would be to alter the label, and not the design. '
Making this distinction is important to both manufacturers and
consumers. For manufacturers, it determines whether they will face
liability. For consumers, it determines whether they will recover
damages for their injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit in Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc.9" did
not reach different conclusions than the majority ofprevious courts that
had examined this issue. The vast majority of cases have held that
FIFRA preempts state causes of actions. This line of case law is a huge
victory to manufacturers of pesticides across the nation. As long as
they comply with EPA-approved guidelines and fully inform the EPA
with regard to their product, manufacturers are protected from liability
in the area of labeling.
However, the preemption presents the disadvantage to
consumers of the lack of remedies available to those affected by these
products. As stated above, consumers can still bring a defective
9See Higgens v. Monsanto Co., 862 F. Supp. 751 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (claims for
negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating are not preempted).951d.
9Anthony Vale, Recent Developments in Toxic Tort Law, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 707
(1999).
971d. (citing Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747-48 (4th Cir. 1993)).
See also Lyall v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 984 F.Supp. 587, 596 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
91184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999).
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manufacturing cause of action. However, they are preempted from
recovering in any claim based upon the labeling of a product that
complies with EPA guidelines. Consumers ultimately bear the risk and
responsibility to make sure that they properly handle these types of
products.
The area ofpackaging still, however, presents problems. Since
the EPA has only regulated in the area of child-resistant packaging,
manufacturers are not immune from suit. Until the EPA acts in this
area, courts can impose liability against the manufacturers of pesticides
and consumers are eligible to recover damages for negligent packaging.
